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I. Introduction
Since the end of 1970’s -and the success of the New Classical School –, the face of
macroeconomics has changed profoundly. On the one hand, the research has turned gradually
away from the analysis of the short-term fluctuations to favor a study of the long term
determining factors of macroeconomic variables. One has studied the determinants of growth and
has interpreted the cycles as fluctuations around these long-term values. On the other hand and in
the same movement, one saw setting itself a general equilibrium macroeconomics. One of the
weapons of these alterations is what is called in a generic way the “à la Ramsey models”. In its
simplest shape, this type of model considers an economic agent with infinite life expectancy, who
decides on the intertemporal allocation of its income and work. Under certain very restrictive
conditions, this economic agent can be interpreted as a “representative agent”, whose choices
represent those of an economy of general equilibrium.1 The “à la Ramsey” models are thus used
to describe macroeconomic phenomena, such as growth or fluctuations, as the result of individual
procedures of intertemporal optimization. Although this use rests on controversial hypotheses -
rational expectations, market clearing, and the figure of the representative agent itself - it is often
considered as a possible way to provide macroeconomics with consistent microeconomic
foundations.
The current success of the “à la Ramsey” models confers in return on Frank Ramsey (1903-
1930) a role in the history of economic thought: that of an illustrious precursor, who would have,
as early as 1928, established the tools privileged by the contemporary macroeconomists. Such is
for example Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-I-Martin’s vision (1995).
But the tributes often do not stop there, and temptation is strong to make Ramsey the
precursor of the current theoretical representations, by qualifying him as precursor of "the
modern theory of the growth" (Barro and Sala-I Martin 1995, 10): one in this case describes
Ramsey’s economic agent with infinite life expectancy as the first representative agent in
macroeconomics, and one describes Ramsey’s contribution as “the prototype for studying the
intertemporal allocation of resources” (Blanchard and Fisher 1989, 21) or "the battery of small
[contemporary] models” (Blanchard 2000, 1381) as many applications of Ramsey’s work.
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1 Two theoretical justifications support this interpretation. The first one resorts to the welfare theorems, the
intertemporal Pareto-optimal choice of the representative agent being associated with a decentralized allocation of
resources. See for instance Blanchard and Fisher (1990, 21 and 50-51). The second justification is bound to the results
of the literature on the aggregation conditions. The representative agent represents fictitiously a general equilibrium
economy, in which individuals are identical, or, in a less caricature way, in which individuals are endowed with
identical and homothetic preferences, but with different initial endowments. In this “hicksian economy” (Arrow and
Hahn 1971, 220), the choices of the representative agent are the same as the ones of a general equilibrium economy.
See for instance Jacques and Rebeyrol (2001).
2Such paternity recognitions arouse naturally curiosity. Ramsey indeed wrote in Cambridge
in the 1920’s, where Marshallian thought was still dominating and impervious to the theory of
general equilibrium. Especially, macroeconomics was not yet an autonomous research field, and
it was not naturally even time to wonder about its microeconomic foundations. Therefore, the
young Cambridge mathematician could not have envisaged the present stakes of the “à la
Ramsey” models and the current interpretations of Ramsey’s work should probably suffer from a
retrospective slant.
Incursion into the original text allows testing these two kinds of assertion: that of the
macroeconomist, looking for pre-Keynesian years heroes, and that of the historian, looking for
the initial theoretical framework, in order to rediscover the issue at stake in 1928. The experience
is then relatively surprising, and leads to two kinds of results.
1. The first one concerns the stakes in Ramsey’s initial contribution. More than the single
determination of a mathematical optimal saving’s rule, the matter was to understand the
consequences of individual savings behaviors on collective welfare. The challenge was therefore,
and more profoundly, to state a theoretical representation allowing connecting a micro- and a
macro level. 2. The second result concerns Ramsey’s theoretical solution. In contrast with some
retrospective interpretations, he exactly avoided any representative agent logic, in the double
sense we give today to this concept in macroeconomics: a way to pass over the individual
idiosyncrasy in constructing a fictional economic agent whose choices represent those of an
underlying decentralized economy or a way to use an agent that reflects the aggregation of
individual behaviors. Ramsey’s challenge was rather to state results concerning macroeconomic
equilibrium by bypassing the partial equilibrium framework he inherited from Cambridge.
Such statements rest logically on two kinds of inquiry I successively lead in the following
pages.
The next section first concentrates on the origin of Ramsey’s inaugural question: “how
much of its income should a nation save” (Ramsey 1928, 543). It shows that Ramsey's theory has
to be read in light of a striking question in the 1920’s: is a laissez-faire system able to warrant a
maximum of collective economic welfare? As regards the question of saving, the problem arises
from a noticeable fact: individuals tend naturally to prefer present satisfactions. The resulting
global saving appears insufficient if we consider the prosperity of the nation, conceived as a
transgenerational entity. Therefore, the 1928 essay deals first of all with a problem of divergence
between the pursuit of the individual interest and the realization of the collective interest.
Taking such a redefinition of the « Ramsey Problem » into account imposes then that our
glance settles on the whole 1928 contribution, as I propose in sections III and IV. One usually
retains in Ramsey’s paper only the first part, dedicated to the mathematical demonstration of the
famous rule of optimal saving. However, this demonstration takes place into a very specific
framework - that of a cooperative-nation refusing to privilege the present moments - and we
guess that Ramsey’s attempt to enlarge his approach in the remainder of the 1928 article was at
least of equal importance in Ramsey’s eyes. In a least known part of his work, he indeed handles
the individual behavior of saving, introduces a discount rate in the problem of optimization, and
discusses some consequences of his analysis on the determinants of the interest rate. A thorough
perusal of Ramsey’s global argumentative logic reveals that he is in fact building, step by step, a
careful study of the consequences of the discount rate on the national welfare and that
progressing in the same movement towards a theoretical representation of a decentralized
economy. His solution rests then on an original concept, which allows him to bind the individual
and the collective levels, the concept of dynasty.
II. Ramsey’s Problem: origin and stakes
Two hypotheses could explain the origin of the 1928 essay. The first assumption relies on the
intellectual path of Ramsey himself: the difficulties he met in the writing of his article on optimal
3taxation, “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation” (1927) could be the roots of the 1928
reflections. In that paper, published in the March issue of the Economic Journal, Ramsey tried to
define the best way to distribute a global amount of tax, so that “the decrement of [global] utility
could be a minimum” (Ramsey 1927, 47). We shall not remind here of his demonstrations but
simply note that in the developments of the fourth part of the 1927 article, dedicated to some
applications of his mathematical result, Ramsey mentions the possibility of a dynamic analysis,
by wondering notably about the opportunity of a differentiated taxation on savings. He does not
succeed in handling this problem, and indicates that it would require “a mathematical theory
considerably more difficult than anything in [the present article]” (Ramsey 1927, 59). He may
have pursued this objective by approaching the drafting of his “Mathematical Theory of Saving”.
The editorial correspondence between Maynard Keynes and Ramsey (Keynes 1983, 784) informs
us indeed that Ramsey had initially planned to deal with taxation on saving in the 1928 paper. He
again gives up2, but this project seems to have partially motivated his research on optimal saving.
The second assumption is bound to the theoretical background, which ruled over the
publication of the 1928 article. Ramsey’s will “to apply the utilitarianism to saving” (Ramsey,
June 1928, in Keynes 1983, 784) would have been suggested by Pigou's reflections on economic
welfare (Chakravarty 1987). More widely, it is advisable to understand Ramsey’s theoretical
ambition through a general reflection on the determinants of welfare and on the ability of the
regime of laissez-faire to guarantee a maximum of collective welfare.
We elsewhere have noticed (Gaspard 2003) that Ramsey began his economist’s short career
in the Apostles Society. In a contribution dated 1923 "Socialism and Equality of Income”
(Ramsey 1923) he notably proposes an analysis of the comparative merits of a free market
economy and a socialist economy. On the occasion of what appears as a plea for economic
planning, Ramsey draws up a picture of the crisis of the 1920’s and a list of the advantages a
bigger control from the State in the economic sphere would bring.3 Such reflections join more
globally in the anxieties of the Cambridge economists, as for the duration of the 1920’s retraining
crisis naturally, but also as for the suitability of the Marshallian theory to grasp correctly the
English economy after the First World War. More exactly, the question discussed at that time is
that of the failures of liberalism, a principle underlying the philosophy of Marshall’s Principles.
In this background, two emblematic reactions are emerging. That of Keynes, who begins to
express the necessity to change the theory, by indicating that it does not correspond any more to
the actual economic organization.4 That of Pigou, who tries to amend Marshallian theory by
estimating the places where State intervention turns out to be necessary for the improvement of
national welfare. Pigou’s research program, started with Wealth and Welfare (1912) and pursued
in multiple editions of The Economics of Welfare (1920 and following ones), consists explicitly
in studying:
“[The] obstacles that prevent a community’s resources from being distributed among different
uses or occupations in the more effective way. […] [The] purpose of this study is essentially
practical. It seeks to bring into clearer light some of the ways in which it now is, or eventually
                                                 
2 In his submission letter to the Economic Journal, Ramsey comments on his own work:
“The mathematics is all very elementary, and the beginning part is fully explained for the sake of those who
will read a little way. Although the matter is terribly oversimplified, the equations must arise in any attempt
to apply utilitarianism to saving and so far as I know they’ve never been treated before. The difficulty is to
find simple results of sufficient generality to be interesting and yet not obvious. In this I think I’ve
succeeded surprisingly well. To prove them is never hard, except when it comes to taxation which is very
complicated and in which I’ve wasted a lot of time with only one achievement of any sort” (Ramsey, June
1928, in Keynes 1983, 784).
The section devoted to taxation disappeared in the published draft.
3 He in particular underlines the defects of coordination of the individual decisions, just as much as the intrinsically
connected tares of a system based on the search for immediate profit (or for secure income).
4 Such an analysis is led notably in his political essays (Keynes 1925, 1926).
4may become, feasible for the governments to control the play of economic forces in such wise as
to promote the economic welfare, and through that, the total welfare, of their citizens as a whole”
(Pigou 1932, 129).
Ramsey learns economic theory with these two personalities. He is personally very close to
Keynes, with whom he shares certain convictions about the roots of the economic crisis.
However, he follows, on the strict theoretical plan, in Pigou’s steps: the 1927 article appears as
an attempt at economic and fiscal policy, in which are assumed the concepts of Pigou. Hence, the
1928 essay could be included as an element of the general program mentioned above.
As far as saving is concerned, the problem arises from a general observation: individuals
tend to overvalue present satisfactions. Pigou underlines this fact in chapter II of The Economics
of Welfare. Pigou's foremost concern in this chapter does not directly deal with saving, since he is
looking for a way to measure subjective economic welfare5. It is notwithstanding the occasion to
deal with the question of the intertemporal choice.
Pigou’s analysis is well-known: he suggests using the quantity of money one is prepared to
supply for a given quantity of commodities as a measure of utility, that is, as a cardinal index of
the individual “satisfaction” or “desire”. Proposing here to confuse desire and satisfaction, Pigou
admits an exception: when individuals estimate future utility, they consider their desire, and
underestimate the future satisfaction brought by consumption or by the ownership of a certain
amount of income. This distinction will not intervene any more in Pigou’s later work, which
never really returns to the question of the intertemporal allocation of resources. It is however the
occasion for a discussion about the economic implications of this individual propensity to
discount future utilities.
Unlike Fisher (1907), Pigou defines - as Ramsey also will do – the discount rate as the
result of a pure time preference, that is independent from the expected stream of income6. Pigou
brings out two explanations for such a pure time preference. The first explanation is that of a
“defective telescopic faculty” (Pigou 1932, 25). Individuals are shortsighted, what leads them to
behaviors that Pigou considers as “irrational” (Pigou 1932, 25). Under the hypothesis according
to which the individual temperament - or the utility function - is invariant over the time, the
argument is that the satisfaction connected to the consumption of a given amount of commodities
in the next period is exactly the same as would be felt today. The pure preference for present
consumption appears so as a distortion with regard to a standard, frequently mentioned - by Rae
as well as by Böhm-Bawerk or by Fisher - : that of an equal treatment of  present and future
satisfactions7. The second explanation lies in the fact that individuals have a finite life. Two
factors intervene here: uncertainty, which carries the risk that the individuals will never take
advantage of the fruits of their saving; and the egoism of the individuals, who express a
preference for themselves over their descendants.
Pigou underlines afterwards two important economic consequences of the tendency to
discount the future. On one hand, the individual efforts (here, the labor supply) intended for
future pleasures are insufficient (Pigou 1932, 25-26). On the other hand, uncertainty and
egoism limit the savings, intended to finance long-term projects of investment. Moreover,
said Pigou, intergenerational altruism and the progress of the stock exchange do not suffice to
compensate for the egoism of the individuals (Pigou 1932, 27). Many investment projects,
which could be essential for the community, risk never to be undertaken if one abandons
them to the private initiative, because of a too long wait for dividends. The overvaluation of
the present satisfactions will therefore have a fatal consequence on the creation of fresh
                                                 
5 Pigou has already defined the objective measure of welfare by the size of the national income.
6 It then corresponds to Böhm-Bawerk’s (1889) psychological motive for the existence of a positive rate of interest.
7 Such a tradition is particularly well studied by Elster and Loewenstein (1992).
5capital:
“The practical way in which these discrepancies between desire and satisfaction work themselves
out to the injury of economic welfare is by checking the creation of new capital an encouraging
people to use up existing capital to such a degree that larger future advantages are sacrificed to
smaller present ones” (Pigou 1932, 27).
Many analytical shifts punctuate here Pigou’s argument. He for instance deviates from the
idea of a simple report of consumption to the possibility to enhance the value of such a report
thanks to investment. He also slides from the description of the individual behavior to an
evaluation of the collective welfare, without any explanation of the underlying economic
mechanisms. However, the diagnostic is clear: private initiative, because of the discount rate of
utility, is not sufficient to maximize the welfare of humanity, present and future. Logically, and
as for the rest of Pigouvian work, there would be here a place for the State (or the government)
“which is the trustee for unborn generations as well as for its present citizens” (Pigou 1932, 29).
In particular, there would be a place for a fiscal legislation encouraging saving.
However, as Collard (1996) notes, a fiscal policy in favor of saving contradicts the criteria
of welfare increase established elsewhere by Pigou8. An economic policy aiming at favoring
saving (for instance a lowering in the income tax or in the tax on successions) would have
contradictory effects. It could admittedly favor a better temporal distribution among generations
and so increase intertemporal welfare. But it also will increase inequalities among people of the
same generation and according to Pigou, will decrease economic welfare, by virtue of the law of
the decreasing marginal utility, tend to increase the welfare of the community at a given moment.
Pigou therefore hesitates to settle the question.
Notwithstanding this analysis allows to identify clearly the stakes of Ramsey's question in
the 1928 article: it is because individual behaviors do not lead to a maximum of collective
welfare – that is because individual interests and national interests diverge - that the theoretical
question of knowing “how much of its income should a nation save?” (Ramsey 1928, 543) makes
sense. Beyond the dilemma of the arbitrage between present and future consumption, defined
usually as the “Ramsey Problem”, hides thus the problem of the divergence between the actual
behavior of individuals and the desirable behavior for collective welfare.
III. The rule and its variations: some unpleasant things to know about the 1928 essay
To systematize Pigou’s analysis thanks to a mathematical theory of saving, supposed so three
stages. The first one consists in defining what should ideally save the national community. The
second stage consists in formalizing what implies, in term of cost for the collective welfare, the
existence of a discount rate in the individual preferences. The third one consists then in defining
the foundations of a fiscal policy.
As we have noticed, Ramsey finally abandoned this third stage when publishing the article.
Both first stages are on the contrary successively handled in the 1928 essay, but without any
reference to something like an aggregation of the individual decisions of saving, and without
allusion to any fictive agent whose choices could represent the underlying individual decisions.
Before considering the nature of his solution, it is necessary to remind here the contents of
Ramsey’s paper. This exercise, although mainly descriptive, shows that the most neglected part
of Ramsey’s work is exactly the one that brings light on Ramsey’s attempt. The synopsis
proposed in the appendix to this paper can help the reader find a way in the maze of Ramsey’s
arguments.
                                                 
8 According to Pigou’s analysis there are two ways to increase the national economic welfare: an increase in the
national dividend itself; a better distribution of this national dividend; Collard shows that Pigou had first mentioned a
third criterion: the egalitarian distribution in time.
6The 1928 essay consists, according to the author’s himself, in three parts. Each seems to
answer different theoretical and technical objectives, and each rests on a set of different
mathematical and institutional assumptions.
The first part: Ramsey’s normative solution
The first part of Ramsey's theory is well known: he approaches the question of optimal saving
through an economic planning point of view. Formally, the nation is represented by:
- A collective net utility function: 
€ 
U(x(t) −V (a(t)), where )(xU  stands for the utility
derived from the global consumption (x) at the moment t ( ℜ∈t ), and )(aV  stands for the
disutility of labor (a). Such a function is assumed invariant in time.
- An aggregate production function ))(),(( tctaf , where )(tc  represents the capital
available in the economy at the moment t. The marginal productivities of capital and labor are
assumed positive and decreasing.
The population is constant, and there is no technical progress (Ramsey 1928, 543). The
community is endowed with a substantive rationality. Its aim of the community is to achieve
what Ramsey calls a state of bliss: a long-term stationary state, where the community reaches (or
tends close to) a maximum level of net satisfaction, “the maximum obtainable rate of
enjoyment”(Ramsey 1928, 549). According to Ramsey, such a bliss path is due either to the
saturation of the net satisfaction itself (case (i))9, or to the saturation of the capital accumulation
(the marginal productivity of capital decreases and finally nullifies (case ii).
Let us recall that in the first part of his essay, and according to a now famous formula,
Ramsey refuses to consider any discount rate of utility, a practice that he qualifies as “ethically
indefensible” and arising from the “poverty of our imagination” (Ramsey 1928, 543).
Under such restrictive assumptions, Ramsey’s rule rests on the transposition, at the
collective or global level, of the marginalists’ equilibrium conditions inherited from Marshall.
Since the model is unisectorial, the equilibrium of the nation is characterized by three equations.
The first equation is an accounting identity. Labor (a) and capital (c) produce a flow of
output f(a,c), which is used either for consumption (x) or for saving (1). Saving is identified with
capital accumulation (
€ 
˙ c ). The second one equates the marginal satisfaction drawn from
consumption and the marginal effort due to work (2) . The third equation expresses the
intertemporal balance of the “rational community:” With u(x) standing for the marginal utility of
consumption,10 we have:
)(),()( xucafxu
dt
d
c ⋅−=
11   (3)
By a game of derivations, integral calculus and variables substitutions, and thanks to a
mathematical definition of bliss (B), Ramsey states the following income allocation rule:
€ 
˙ c = B − U(x) −V (a)( )
u(x)
(5)
The rule indicates the level of saving, or investment, the community should adopt at every date:
“The rate of saving multiplied by marginal utility of consumption should always be equal bliss
minus actual rate of utility enjoyed” (Ramsey, 1928, 547)
It is the Keynes-Ramsey’s rule, such as it was named in the 1960’s12. In absence of a discount
                                                 
9 The nation tends in this case to the greatest level of satisfaction “conceivable” (Ramsey 1928, 544).
10 We have: )()( xUxu ′=
11 Equations (2) and (3) are in fact Euler’s equations.
12 Koopmans (1965) re-states this rule when demonstrating the existence of an optimal path of capital accumulation
aiming towards Phelp’s golden rule. He summaries Ramsey's argument and observes that in the absence of discount
7rate of future satisfactions, the determination of the saving level is purely teleological: the
community takes her decision by considering the distance that still separates her from the ideal
state of the end of times (the bliss path). This rule defines a unique optimal path of capital
accumulation, as a suite of optimal decisions at every date. Through the definition of B indeed,
Ramsey characterizes a final state of the trajectory of capital accumulation, which exempts from
any transversality condition in infinite horizon13.
The remainder of the 1928 essay consists in a set of theoretical tracks, which amend
gradually the hypotheses of the first part.
The second part: Community vs. individual
The second part of Ramsey’s article splits into three paragraphs. After having proposed a graphic
illustration of his savings rule (§ IIa)14, Ramsey proposes a transposition of his rule in the case of
an individual who lives a finite life (§ IIb). He then introduces a positive discount rate and deals
successively with the community behavior, then with the individual behavior (§ IIc). The
difficulty is that each paragraph introduces modifications in the initial set of assumptions.
The first modification deals with the shape of the production function. On the occasion of
the graphic representation, Ramsey in fact assumes that:
“returns to capital and labor are constant and independent, so that: ,),( rcpacaf +=  where p, the
rate of wages, and r the rate of interest are constants” (Ramsey 1928, 549).
The assumption consists a priori simply in the definition of a particular shape for the production
function. This peculiar shape should allow a simple graphical representation, which rests on a
change of variable (Ramsey 1928, 550). To assume that the productivity of capital is constant
makes also the equation (2) a differential equation simple to resolve. Such a specification is
however curious, because it means that the production factors are perfectly substitutable15.
Especially, capital accumulation does not imply the decline of the marginal productivity any
more and there is therefore no more technical limit to the to the increase of the global product (or
income). From then on, if the marginal productivity of capital is constant, alone the definition (i)
of the bliss path has a sense: the long-term steady state corresponds to a state of utility saturation.
Such consequences are not discussed by Ramsey. Let us moreover note that it appears, with this
specification, an identification between the marginal productivity of factors and their prices
(interest and wage), which suggests that the production factors receive a constant payment,
according to their (constant) contribution to production. In that case, Ramsey seems to use an
equilibrium condition (factors are paid their marginal productivity) to express an equation of
product exhaustion.
The study of the individual behavior (§ IIb) rests exclusively on a graphical demonstration,
and preserves the new assumptions on the production function. Ramsey must however modify his
analysis to integrate the following fact: an individual lives only a finite life, and cannot hope to
                                                                                                                                                        
rate of utility, the only optimal path among all possible paths beginning with a given amount of capital verifies
Ramsey’s final rule. Koopmans restates the equation (5) (Koopmans, 1965, 243 and 272-275) and names it the
« Keynes-Ramsey's condition » (1965, 243). Cass (1965) uses optimal control to define existence conditions of an
optimal path of capital accumulation. He introduces a discount rate of utility but analyzes the case without discount
rate and finds the same rule as Ramsey, which he calls “Keynes-Ramsey's rule” (Cass, 1965, 239). We do not know
when the expression “Keynes-Ramsey condition” was used to refer to the Euler’s equation of the problem, that is the
equation (3) of Ramsey’s paper. Even today, this expression refers alternately to equation (3) or to Ramsey’s final
rule.
13 See Chiang (1992, 115).
14 These notations are Ramsey’s ones.
15 Ramsey’s formulation means indeed a production function like 
€ 
f (a,c) =αa+ βc , where α  and β  are positive
real numbers.
8achieve one day the state of bliss. The rule of optimal saving should be redefined, because B has
now no meaning. In order to define the maximum level of satisfaction that an individual could
achieve, Ramsey indicates “we must know how much capital our man feels it necessary to leave
his heirs” (Ramsey 1928, 552). He argues after that in a purely graphical way, by distinguishing
two cases, as the bequeathed capital is superior or inferior to the level of initial capital. We shall
not clarify here his reasoning. Let us simply retain that with the equations (1), (2) and (3), and if
we know the borders of the capital accumulation trajectory (
€ 
c(0) and )(Tc ), we can define a
unique path of consumption or saving, which is the solution of a maximization program of utility
under an intertemporal constraint.
The following paragraph introduces a third modification. Ramsey tries to know “How our
results must be modified when we no longer reckon future utilities and disutilities as equal to
present ones, but discount them at a constant rate ρ ” (Ramsey 1928, 553). He is here anxious to
precise first, that it is necessary to distinguish the objective discount rate (the interest rate) from
the subjective discount rate and second, that the discount rate must be assumed constant:
“This is the only assumption we can make, without contradicting our fundamental hypothesis that
successive generations are actuated by the same system of preferences. ” (Ramsey 1928, 553).
Ramsey specifies in fact that his theoretical framework (in particular the hypothesis of unchanged
preferences over time) implies the assumption of constant discount rate. The constancy of the
subjective discount rate does not appear as a simplifying or realistic hypothesis, but as a way to
maintain the consistency of the rational agent’s behavior. In fact, the definition of intertemporal
preferences should integrate a property of dynamic consistency: the community cannot be incited
to modify the initially chosen trajectory of consumption and saving during the capital
accumulation process. Ramsey chooses so an exponential discount function, which is
characterized by a constant discount rate16. Strotz (1956) will show some decades later that it is
there the only discount function compatible with temporal consistency, at least in certain
environment.
Ramsey first envisages the behavior of the community. Two scenarios are possible.
The first case consists in supposing a strictly positive discount rate lower than the interest
rate r, which is still assumed constant. This situation leads to save, because the rate of payment
for saving is superior to the subjective rate of valuation of future utilities. The rhythm of saving
will be defined by use of the equations (1) and (2), and by a modified intertemporal balance
equation:
€ 
˙ u(x) = −u(x) ⋅ fc (a,c) − ρ{ } = −u(x)(r − ρ) (3’)
The marginal utility of consumption should decrease at a rate given by the difference between the
interest rate (a constant rate, explicitly identified here with the marginal productivity of capital)
and the discount rate. If the interest rate is superior to the discount rate, the marginal utility of the
consumption decreases at a constant rate and the consumption describes a continuously
increasing path, as long as the marginal utility of consumption does not nullify. Ramsey uses then
the same method of replacements as in the first part of the article, by using the equations (1), (2)
and (3’) to determine a new rule of saving, which makes this time intervene a level of “modified
bliss” (Ramsey 1928, 554).
The second case corresponds to a situation where 
€ 
r < ρ . The agent is in that case little
                                                 
16 The discount function is: ρττ −= eF )( , where τ stands for the distance between the current and the future periods
of consumption. The discount rate is the opposite of the decreasing rate of the discount function on the horizon τ  :
ρτ
τ =′− )(
)(
F
F , which is constant. These expressions are not given in the 1928 essay, but they appear in a letter
from Ramsey to Keynes dated July 1928 (Keynes 1983, 788).
9inclined to saving. The equation (3’) indicates that marginal utility of consumption rises at the
constant rate 
€ 
−(r − ρ). The consumption path follows a continuously decreasing profile and the
net satisfaction, instead of tending to bliss falls gradually towards “the barest subsistence level at
which its marginal utility may be taken as infinite, if we disregard the possibility of suicide”
(Ramsey 1928, 555).
Next comes briefly the study of the individual case, with discount rate of utility. It does not
raise any peculiar problem for Ramsey who only notices that “ as in [II.]b, we can adapt our
solution to the case of an individual with only a finite time to live”(Ramsey 1928, 555). Ramsey
alludes here to a graphic resolution.
The third part: the family and the new long-term equilibrium
The third part of the essay pursues the investigation by studying theoretical implications of the
previous paragraphs: Ramsey will this time evoke classes of individuals with finite life
expectancy and indifferent to their heirs (§ IIIχ), these classes being differentiated by their
discount rate of future utilities. He finally will scrutinize the implications of a differentiation of
“families” with infinite life expectancy on the long-term equilibrium (§ IIIβ).
Previously, he deals for a while with the macroeconomic determination of the real interest rate (§
IIIα). He comes back to the initial theoretical framework of the community, in which the
marginal productivity of the production factors is positive and continuously decreasing, but he
now assumes that “everyone discounts future utility for himself or his heirs at the same rate ρ”
(Ramsey 1928, 556). Ramsey affixes this time a magnifying glass on what happens on the capital
market, the only market envisaged in the article. With a Marshallian method, he treats this market
in partial equilibrium, confronting a virtual demand function for capital stemming from the
productive side of the community, with the supply of saving stemming from this same
community.
As in Marshallian analysis, the interest rate is in the very short period determined by the
demand price for capital. If the stock of capital is given 0c  the demand price for capital is the
maximal price accepted by the community as a producer to get this stock of capital. It is equal to
the marginal productivity of capital. If the marginal productivity of capital for 0c  is strictly
superior to the discount rate of future utilities, ρ>),( 0cafc , the community would save. The
saving level (or the capital accumulation 
€ 
˙ c ) is determined by the Keynes-Ramsey’s rule as
defined in paragraph IIc. For a given level of the marginal productivity of capital, the economic
agent defines a certain rate of saving, which is going to increase the stock of current assets. In the
next period, the interest rate remains determined by the marginal productivity of this new stock of
global capital. The level of this capital has however been made endogenous by the saving’s rule.
The accumulation process stops when the marginal productivity of capital has enough decreased
as to reach a value equal to ρ. The community has reached a stationary state, in which it enjoys
the modified bliss. In this stationary state, there is neither saving, nor accumulation, and the
whole income is devoted to consumption. As in Marshallian theory, the ultimate supply of capital
(
€ 
ˆ c ) (which corresponds to a null supply of accumulation 
€ 
˙ c = 0) determines the long-term price of
capital (the long-term interest rate). The demand determines this time the quantity of capital
finally accumulated cˆ , which should be such as ρ=)ˆ,( cafc .
Therefore, during the process of capital accumulation, the interest rate is determined by the
marginal productivity of capital. Once the long-term steady state achieves, the equilibrium
interest rate is fixed by the subjective discount rate. The economy stays in a stationary state,
called modified bliss (in fact what is nowadays called the path of “modified golden rule”). Let us
note that if the discount rate is null, the community accumulates capital until the marginal
productivity nullifies: the community achieves in this case the state of bliss (or the golden rule
path). The distinction between the short- and the long period governs the last two paragraphs of
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the 1928 essay.
Ramsey sets first the action on short term, considering the individual level. He stages this
time classes of individuals who are differentiated by their discount rate. He then approaches a
long-term analysis with the introduction of new economic agents: the families.
In paragraph IIIβ, he considers individuals who live a finite life, are perfectly indifferent to
the lot of their heirs and who “start [their] working life without any capital and end it without
any, having spent [their] savings on an annuity” (Ramsey 1928, 557). The individuals react to an
interest rate, which is “supposed constant” (Ramsey 1928, 557). If, for a given individual 
€ 
ρ > r ,
this individual is going to save according to the rule revealed in both first and second parts of the
article: “If we neglect variations in his earning power, his action can be calculated by modifying
the equations of II.c to apply to a finite life as in IIb” (Ramsey 1928, 558). Such an individual
will accumulate capital during a time and will then spend everything. Now
“Besides this man, we must suppose there to be in our community other men, exactly like him
except for being born at different times. The total capital possessed by n men of this sort whose
birthdays are spread evenly through the period of a lifetime will be n times the average capital
possessed by each in the course of his life. The class of men of this sort will, therefore, possess a
constant capital depending on the rate of interest, and it will be the amount of capital supplied by
them at this price. (If r>ρ , it may be negative, as they may borrow when young and pay back
when old). We can then obtain the total supply curve of capital by adding together the supplies
provided at a given price by each class of individual”(Ramsey 1928, 558).
On one hand, we are so in presence with classes of identical (except their age) individuals who
accumulated and supply on average a given amount of capital. For a given value of the real
interest rate, the behavior of saving gives birth to an average stock of supplied capital. We have
on the other hand classes characterized by different discount rates, which offer each a stock of
capital for a given interest rate. The sum of these stocks fixes the global supply of capital. The
meeting of this supply function with the demand function determines an equilibrium interest rate,
which is given by the marginal productivity of capital. This interest rate will be equal to the
discount rate of a “marginal saver” (1928, 558), in fact a marginal class of savers.
The classes of individuals that have a discount rate superior to this equilibrium interest rate
are going to save. The others are on the contrary looking for wasting their capital: Ramsey can
finally return to an analysis in infinite horizon by considering either individuals but families with
infinite life expectancy, which discount their utility at a constant rate but each at her own rate.
He once again simplifies his production function by neglecting the labor contribution. The
total income is then a function of c, )(cf . The rate of interest is still determined at the moment t
by the marginal productivity of capital )(cf ′ , which is positive but decreasing. He adds then that
one can suppose that
“Every individual could attain the maximum conceivable utility with a finite income 1x , and that
no one could support life on less than 2x ” (Ramsey 1928, 558).
Ramsey sets then the action at once in a long-term equilibrium state, keeping silent about the way
of reaching it. We can guess that one leaves an initial situation, where the short-term interest rate
of equilibrium is equal to the discount rate of the marginal class of savers, and that a
differentiated accumulation process takes place. Ramsey implies that, as in the part dedicated to
the determination of the interest rate, the accumulation process of a community, so formed by
families, is going to stop for a given amount of accumulated capital cˆ , for which the marginal
productivity of capital is equal to a certain value rˆ . In the final state of equilibrium, he says,
“Families, say )(rm in number, whose rate of discount is less than r must have attained bliss or
they would still be increasing their expenditure […]. Consequently, they have between them an
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income 1)( xrm ⋅ . The other families, )(rmn−  in number (where m is the total number of
families), must be down to the subsistence level, or they would be still decreasing their
expenditure. […]In such a case, therefore, equilibrium would attained by a division of society into
two classes, the thrifty enjoying bliss and the improvident at the subsistence level” (Ramsey 1928,
559) 17
In the stationary state, the total income of the community will be from then on shared between
two classes of savers according to the equation:
€ 
f ( ˆ c) = m(ˆ r)x1 + (n −m( ˆ r))x2
The global equilibrium values would be so defined with this equation of final distribution of
income and an equation indicating that the real interest rate of long-term equilibrium is equal to
the marginal productivity of the accumulated capital: )ˆ(ˆ cfr = .
Such a conclusion seems to close curtly, from a normative point of view, Pigou’s
interrogation on the judiciousness to consider or not any discount rate in the analysis of the
intertemporal behavior. By comparing the mathematical results of each of these developments,
the message seems clear: when the nation with perfect forecast – and refusing to discount future
utilities- follows the initial rule, it is promised to bliss. The introduction of the discount rate,
associated with the hypothesis of temporal consistency eases this happy perspective and can only
lead to a level of “modified bliss”. Finally, if the individuals are differentiated by their discount
rates, the same rule indicates that some take the risk of eternal poverty. Therefore, if one tries to
define “how much of its income should a nation save”, it seems that it is better to conform to the
ideal described in the first part of the article, either by the adoption of a centralized regime, or by
the intervention of economic policy. But what are finally the springs of such a demonstration?
IV. Splendors and misery of a theory of saving
Having now reached the term of a linear presentation of the theoretical developments in the
remainder of the 1928 essay, I would like to complete it by three general comments.
1. First of all, Ramsey’s text surprises the contemporary reader by the number of handled
situations, and by the establishment, or at least the intuition, of results that are not usually
associated with the 1928 contribution. That contribution is in fact often reduced to its first part,
which is considered as a departure point for the reflections on optimal growth. Two points are
then retained: the stating of the mathematical rule of optimal saving on one hand; the choice of a
utilitarian criterion to express the intertemporal welfare, that is the refusal of time preference on
the other hand. One indicates then the progress of techniques of intertemporal optimization, or
one discusses the aptness of the refusal to discount utilities - both points being sometimes bound
in the reflections on the existence conditions of an optimal intertemporal path18. Nevertheless,
and in spite of doubtless outmoded mathematical tools, a closer reading reveals a less evident
ethical choice, and the definition, with the introduction of the time preference, of a long term
equilibrium – the modified bliss- which corresponds fundamentally to what is nowadays called
the modified golden rule. We could furthermore spot in Ramsey’s text the intuition of a life cycle
saving’s theory. Finally, it appears clearly that there is no need to wait for Barro's (1974)
justification of the consideration of economic agents with infinite life expectancy, to see
appearing the notion of family or dynasty as relevant theoretical concept to analyze the
intertemporal choices.
                                                 
17 We don’t really know how such a stationary state is reached. Is everything decided at the initial moment, the initial
value of the interest rate (the marginal productivity of the initial capital) deciding between families intended to bliss
or those destined to the subsistence level? Or does Ramsey envisage a more complex process, where accumulation of
the first type of families and debts of the second type would counterbalance only partially, what would make vary the
stock of aggregate capital, the marginal productivity of capital, and would redefine a border between savers' families?
18 For a survey of contributions to optimal growth theory since 1928, see for instance Chakravarty (1987).   
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2. The asymmetry in the posterity of Ramsey’s work corresponds doubtless to the initial
asymmetry that characterizes the care brought by the author himself to the first part of the essay
and the vagueness that presides on the contrary over the following developments. While the first
part is completely specified, Ramsey then is particularly sparing of comments. The paragraphs of
parts II and III adopt changeable, sometimes implicit, often ad hoc hypotheses, in the sense that
they are sometimes used only to help in the demonstration being then quickly given up. Ramsey
takes however the previous results for granted and do not feel necessary to re-demonstrate them
when the hypotheses vary. Such is for example the choice of the production function with
constant marginal productivities: Useful for the graphic representation, and for the description of
the behavior of saving with discount rate, it disappears then in the third part of the text. It would
not present particular problems if the results established in this framework were not used in the
third part.
Further, Ramsey seems often worried about technical precision but does not condescend to
justify crucial assumptions: when he introduces for instance the discount rate, he dedicates a big
part of his analysis to the justification of the fact that this rate should be constant. He on the
contrary forgets to explain why, thoroughly having described this practice as indefensible, he
finally agrees to consider it, even when nothing has changed in the analysis except the
assumption of constant marginal productivity.
3. Finally, Ramsey’s text is characterized by an oscillation, or a permanent tension between
the treatment of the community and that of the individual, both decision-making figures involved
in Ramsey’s problem such as we have re-defined it in the second section of this paper. Ramsey
explains nothing on the links that unite these two entities, except one thing: he does not envisage
any aggregation of the behaviors of identical individuals. When dealing in the first part with the
national behavior, he does not try to justify the use of global” functions, such as the global utility
and disutility function and a fortiori, he carefully avoids referring to any kind of aggregating
procedure. When introducing the case of the individual choice, he in fact precise that he applies
the same method to the treatment of two different questions: the optimal allocation of the national
income and that of an individual income. As he explains for instance “In assuming the rate of
discount constant, I do not mean that it is the same for all individuals, since we are at present
concerned with one individual or community […]” (Ramsey 1928, 553). He also reminds a few
paragraphs later that “the method of resolution, both for a community and for an individual is
[…] the same as [in the first part]” (Ramsey 1928, 554), but he nowhere claims that the optimal
saving behavior of the “nation” can arise from the sum of optimal behavior of individuals
identical in their preferences.
He does not either suggest that the national behavior could appear as such from the
underlying individual choices: while the behavior of the nation supposes exactly the absence of
discount rate, the individuals them discount their future satisfactions. Finally, when he introduces
classes of individuals, it is then to burst the nation by differentiating these classes by the discount
rates, as intrinsic element of the preference. We therefore cannot attribute to Ramsey the idea of a
possible “representative agent”, in contrast with the temptation of some retrospective analyses.
Community and individual conceptually stay two separate entities.
However, Ramsey’s argument is not free from ambiguity. On this point too, there is a
blatant asymmetry between the attention carried to the formal conditions of extension of his
initial rule on one hand, and the doubt he on the contrary lets hang over the institutional
framework or the status of the economic entity who decides to save on the other hand. While he
defines exactly the implications of the finite life expectancy – and studies many configurations
depending on whether the individual leaves inheritance or not- Ramsey clarifies nothing on the
economic organization in which takes place the individual decision. We guess that we are leaving
a framework of planned economy but we do not really know what could replace it. Should one
consider an individual in autarky, who would be both consumer and owner of his production
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structure, what suggests the simple transposition of the initial rule, established in the framework
of the community? Alternatively, should one consider an individual in society, that is in
interaction with other individuals? Ramsey does not enlighten us on this point.
Put simply, Ramsey's text distinguishes by mysteries, which surround notably the
conception of the economic organization in which takes place the saving decision, and by a
choice of moving ad hoc  hypotheses. It is characterized on the other hand by the will to
distinguish the micro- and the macro-order, and by preservation of an intertemporal consistency
assumption as for the behavior of the decision-making entity is concerned. By exploiting what is
explicit in Ramsey’s paper, it is therefore possible to understand the implicit, and to exhume the
global consistency of the argument. The consistency appears in fact more clearly if we scrutinize
more specifically the status of the decision-making entities which inhabit the 1928 essay.
V. The faces of the economic agent
The first decision-making entity appearing in the article of 1928 is so the nation, considered as a
transgenerational entity. As we have already said, the first part of the essay is enough precise so
that we can clarify the corresponding economic representation. Two points should be raised,
which are profoundly connected: the implicit organization of the cooperative-economy and the
refusal to consider a discount rate.
In the first part of the 1928 article, Ramsey’s opts at once for a macroeconomic glance, by
choosing to represent the national economy as what can be described with Joan Robinson (1978)
as a “cooperative”. The nation, or the “community” (Ramsey 1928, 543), is embodied by an
abstract economic agent – who is at the same time a producer, a consumer and a working
provider – who lives forever and whose identity endures in time. This very specific
representation is crucial for the demonstration of the saving rule.
It allows indeed two "tours de force". On the one hand, it allows the transposition of
marginalist equilibrium equations to the collective level. In an economic tradition dominated by
the theory of partial equilibrium, it was doubtless the only possibility to justify such a use of the
marginalists’ results, which were up to those days reserved for the study of individual behavior.
On the other hand, the main advantage of this overall presentation is to allow concentrating on
the decision-problem and to exempt from analyzing any question of coordination of individual
decentralized decisions. It dispenses from the outset with any kind of adjustment process. These
questions are solved by definition19. In the first part of Ramsey’s article, there is thus no need to
make explicit the markets’ functioning (for goods, labor or loanable funds). Formally, it means
that it is not necessary to formalize prices, as vectors of information and coordination. The only
exogenous elements are therefore the “structural” parameters. Every equilibrium condition is
expressed by Ramsey directly in terms of marginal utilities and of marginal productivity of the
production factors, which could be interpreted as shadow prices.
Further, such a representation also excludes by definition the questions of wealth
distribution among the members of the community, and even, with the choice of a utilitarian
criterion of aggregation of the instantaneous utilities, among the different “generations”. The
question of the distribution (of labor or wealth) is not considered by the nation - the planner- as in
the literature wondering about the possibility of comparing competitive systems or centralized
systems. The community is in equilibrium all the time but this equilibrium, or this succession of
equilibriums is purely postulated.
                                                 
19 Ramsey is certainly not the first one to envisage the global behavior of an economy as a foreground question.
Besides the whole classical literature, the marginalist economists begin, at the end of the nineteenth century, to
reinstate problems of macroeconomic order. That is the case with J. Bates Clark (1899), who assimilates the economy
to a giant firm; that is also a question for the researches dealing with the establishment of social welfare functions
(Pareto 1913, Pigou 1932 for example). However these analyses preserve a study of coordination or of the
aggregation conditions.
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Such approach is fundamentally consistent with Ramsey’s refusal to introduce a discount
rate of future utilities in the first part of the article. Ramsey appeals here to two types of
justification of this refusal.
The first justification –to discount future utilities is “ethically indefensible” (Ramsey 1928,
543)- rests on an interpretation of the discount rate as a social actualization rate. Ramsey's refusal
joins here in a utilitarian tradition, which considers discounting as an intergenerational injustice.
This point of view, which we found by Pigou, is, as Collard (1996) points out, a common
consideration in the Cambridge classical or neoclassical tradition. The second justification is
more directly bound to our comment: it is profoundly connected to the institutional framework
retained in the first part of Ramsey’s essay. The “poverty of the imagination” (Ramsey 1928,
543) echoes here Pigou’s defective telescopic faculty: the impossibility to correctly represent
oneself the future events20. Such a consideration would not have its place within the framework
of perfect forecasting hold here. Besides, it is noteworthy that the representation of the nation as a
unique economic agent with infinite life expectancy abolishes formally any idea of generation
gaps: the nation as an undivided entity has no reason for favoring on principle such or such phase
of its own life. Furthermore, no uncertainty presses here on the decision to consume or to save.
Thus, the three motives for the discounting mentioned by Pigou in chapter II of The Economics of
Welfare have no place in the first part of Ramsey’s essay. The nation is in a way the opposite of
the individual.  
Why, from then on, agree finally to introduce a discount rate, even when Ramsey is still
interested in the national behavior of saving, as it is the case in the paragraph IIb of the 1928
essay? What is today a natural or usual assumption contradicts on the contrary Ramsey’s initial
comments and could relegate our analysis towards the over interpretation. If we prolong our
reasoning, and if we accept filiations between Pigou's analysis and Ramsey’s work, such motives
(uncertainty, egoism and nearsightedness) can indeed only appear in a theory of the individual
behavior of saving. The contradiction can be raised if one agrees to consider this counter natural
association, according to terms of Ramsey himself, as a provisory stage in a wider demonstration.
It so appears as a temporary step, amending gradually the initial framework in order to progress
toward the consideration of the individual behavior. Our hypothesis, admittedly quite surprising a
priori, seems consolidated if one considers this time all the hypotheses introduced into the second
part of the essay.
Besides the consideration of life expectancy (and of the discount rate), the individual can
not indeed be considered as a cooperative or as an amoeba any more. Now, if Ramsey says
nothing on the economic organization supposed during the essay, a footnote, concerning the
shape of the function of production, delivers deciding indications.
Having introduced the hypothesis of the constant marginal productivities, Ramsey
comments in a footnote:
“[These assumptions] are less absurd if the state is one among others which are only advancing
slowly, so that the rates of interest and wage are largely independent of what our particular state
saves and earns” (Ramsey 1928, 549).
This quotation concerns in fact more the assumption of a constant rate of interest and rate of
wage than the generic shape of the production function. It suggests a new interesting idea: the
nation could be seen as a “small opened economy”, whose choices, or fate, do not influence the
prices, in peculiar the interest rate. Ramsey would then assimilate or confuse a hypothesis of
                                                 
20 The word “imagination”, stemming from psychology, appears frequently in the literature to describe the power of
abstraction from the present situation: John Rae is talking about “ deficit of imagination” to appoint the cultural
valuation of the present pleasures (see Rothbard 1987, 645). Böhm-Bawerk (1889) uses the term of imagination
systematically and exclusively in the book V of The positive theory of capital, dedicated to the subjective
apprehension of the future.
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constant prices with a hypothesis concerning the decisional entity, that is a hypothesis of a “price-
taker” agent. Ramsey leaves us however with this mysterious comment and concentrates on the
explanation of the graphical analysis. But we can note first that with the assumption of constant
prices appears also the first allusion to the existence of prices in the analyses. And if we pursuit
the idea according to which Ramsey would associate constant price and given prices, this
modification takes all its sense when dealing with the individual behavior. Therefore, Ramsey
would not have in mind, when transposing his rule to the individual case, a representation of an
individual in autarky, but indeed the idea of a price-taker individual. Assumptions on the shape of
the production function would then be an institutional assumption as much as a formal
assumption. Once again, the assumption would anticipate the study of the individual behavior.
This gliding in the analysis appears then clearly when, in the third part of the essay, Ramsey
considers the market of capital, the only market evoked in the 1928 text. The individuals confront
their subjective discount rate with a given interest rate, and of this confrontation emerges the
short-term value of the interest rate. In all these discussions, Ramsey deals with “constant”
interest rate.
Therefore, whereas the shape of the production function, the introduction of a discount rate,
and the ghostly apparition of a market for loanable funds invite criticism or perplexity within the
framework of the cooperative economy, they seem more adequate to the treatment of the
individual behavior. The finite life expectancy of the individual can explain the introduction of a
discount rate as well as the consideration of a price-taker individual can justify the hypothesis of
constant prices, that is, by Ramsey, given prices. We can then interpret the variations of the
second part as many preparatory stages in the formalization of the individual behavior.
Nevertheless, as we have noticed, these developments are punctuated with the reaffirmation that
the community and the individual are two separate theoretical entities.
A similar reading of the third part of Ramsey’s essay allows taking the measure of such an
interpretation. In this third part, Ramsey introduces a new economic agent, which appears as a
midway figure between the individual and the undivided community: the “family”, corresponding
exactly to what we today understand by “dynasty”.
The concept of family allows indeed two ways to split the community, in order to give her a
theoretical representation connecting with individual characteristics. It first of all allows to split
the national entity in the time, and to think an economic agent with infinite life expectancy as a
succession of agents with finished life expectancy. Ramsey puts so an agent with infinite life
expectancy, for which it not inconceivable any more to associate with a discount rate of the
future utilities. It opens logically the door to an analysis of the consequences of the individual
inclination to discount future utilities on the long-term equilibrium of the economy.
The notion of family allows as well splitting the cooperative community at every date. The
national economy is this time compound, all the time, with individuals differentiated by their
discount rate. Those individuals apply the rule defined in IIb and their behavior of saving allows
Ramsey to endogeneize the rhythm of capital accumulation. They are price-taker individual, or at
least, their behavior is not enough strong to make vary the value of the interest rate. But such
(short term) interest rate of equilibrium engages the movement of separation of the community
into two classes that defines the long-term macro equilibrium.
The family is so an intermediate figure, mixing in a consistent way individual and national
characteristics, which allows him, in an admittedly artificial way, to think the characteristics of a
long-term macroeconomic equilibrium by bypassing the yoke of the partial equilibrium
framework.
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The general movement of the 1928 article is then that of a partial explosion of the initial
cooperative community, thanks to the family agent, 21 which indicates the search for a theoretical
representation that could represent an alternative to the initial cooperative representation. Such a
solution to study the effects of the individual behavior of saving on the collective welfare rests
notwithstanding on a kind of subterfuge. It bases indeed on a change in the status of the decision
entity and on the use of the market of capital as a control lever to examine the macroeconomic
consequences of the individual tendency to discount. Ramsey so avoids analyzing the
mechanisms that give concrete expression to the interaction of the individual behaviors (the
supply side remains for instance represented by a global production function).
VI. Conclusion
The question of the coexistence of a utility discount rate with the concern for the lot of future
generations is a “classic” by Cambridge economists. The first part of Ramsey’s article evoked a
clear-cut position; the practice that consists in discounting is simply indefensible. This refusal of
a discount rate is logically implied by the representation of the economy as a cooperative. This
community could suffer neither from a split of the personality (leading it to favor such or such
phase of his life) nor from failing telescopic faculties. On the contrary, the identity split of the
community over the time, through the definition of families constituted by mortal individuals -
certainly bound together by blood relationships but having different identities - can bring a
consistent justification for the consideration of a discount rate. If the identity of the agent with
infinite life expectancy is segmented, there can be no more moral or rational reason to justify the
fact that present generations carry the complete weight of saving, whereas future generations are
bursting with bliss. While the second part of the article showed an association community -
discounting, contradictory with the assertions of part I, the family entity enlightens this
temporary association.
The concept of family also introduces a split of the community at every date. The society is
now composed with different individuals. We do not really know what is the modality of their
social interactions – because the individuals are only perceived through their supply of saving –
but their saving decisions, confronted globally, determine the real interest rate of equilibrium
(and the evolution of the product via the capital accumulation). In retrospect, the third part
therefore justifies the formalization of the saving behavior of economic agents considering the
interest rate as constant, but also the fact that the distance between the discount rate and the
marginal productivity of the global capital can stay constant, if the saving behavior of every
individual is not powerful enough to make it vary. What was meaningless in the second part of
the article – except if we assimilate the community to a small opened economy – meets
ultimately a partial justification in the consideration of this dynastic behavior.
So, while the first part of the article can find an autonomous logic, which has doubtless
make its success some decades later, the developments of the second and third parts by spreading
out multiple ways of reflection only take sense in the last paragraph of the article. This last
paragraph marks then the resolution of an underlying tension inside the whole Ramsey’s
argumentation: between representation of the behavior of the cooperative community with
infinite life expectancy, and that of the individual behavior of the price-taker agent with finite
                                                 
21 There is thus no need to wait for Barro (1974) and his definition of dynasties, to see appearing in an implicit but
completely coherent way, a logical association between family and discount rate of utility. But while in Barro's
article, the problem is to pass from the individual figure to that of an agent with infinite life and to justify, by an
intergenerationnal incomplete altruism, the coexistence of a discount rate (due to the nearsightedness of the initial
agent) and the consideration of the future generations (which are integrated into the initial utility function), Ramsey's
construction leaves the national figure without discount rate (where there is no need to resort to an altruistic
hypothesis because the individual who saves and the one that profit of the capital accumulation capital is the same),
then to justify the discount rate by the dis-aggregation of the community.
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live slides an intermediate figure, that of the family.
In these thought processes, the study of the cooperative economy endowed with perfect
forecasts fulfills a heuristic as well as a normative function. It allows the establishment of the
initial mathematical rule, by authorizing the use of total production and total utility functions, and
by allowing to concentrate on a simple question, that of the equilibrium economy. It then darkens
the question of the coordination of the underlying individual decisions, and allows concentrating
on the convergence towards the long period stationary path. The main result of the first part, the
Keynes-Ramsey rule, defines so a rule of decision of saving for every moment, which allows
attaining bliss as soon as possible. At the same time, the framework of the cooperative economy
allows treating the community as a rational agent, that is a maximizating agent endowed with
consistent intertemporal preferences, the behavior of which is by definition the best possible. It
establishes a standard by virtue of which to estimate or to direct the real behavior, by virtue of
which one can also compare the alternate results proposed in the following paragraphs of the
article. It then offers a first answer to Pigou’s dilemma about the legitimacy of a political
economy in favor of saving.
Once established, the mathematical rule of saving serves as an Ariadne’s clew in the
consideration of more complex questions. During the article, Ramsey seems more careful with
the formal conditions of transposition of his rule than with the successive modifications of the
theoretical and institutional framework that these variations imply. Ramsey's argumentation, and
the way he brings us gradually towards the conclusion of the article, takes partially the shape of a
subterfuge. In substance, he indeed says simply: “I take the rule demonstrated in I; I argue by
analogy with the IIb to establish the transposition of the rule of the IIc in the individual case and
integrate it into the IIIβ. I prolong then this IIIβ by means of the reasoning defined in IIIα, and I
arrive, with some supplementary and simplifying hypotheses, in the conclusion of the IIIγ”. Now,
the underlying economic representation in each of the paragraphs of the article, is never either
completely the same, or completely an other one, and the theoretical links between the elements
finally assembled are not inevitably as evident as Ramsey claims.
These variations take nevertheless sense in the movement that one operates, from the figure
of the nation towards that of the family with infinite life expectancy. This movement is in our
sense a conscious objective in the second and third parts of the 1928 essay. They reveal
theoretical results which are not always associated with the 1928 essay, such as the widening of
the analysis to the consideration of a subjective discount rate and the definition of the modified
bliss, or the distinction between the determinants of a positive real rate of interest in the
accumulation period (marginal productivity of capital) and in the stationary state (discount rate of
utility). Furthermore, the whole article tends clearly to show the superiority, in terms of collective
welfare, of the economic representation chosen in the first part of the article. If we follow
Ramsey’s argument step by step, it appears that he introduces after all an intermediate figure
between the individual and the nation, which allows to bound the individual behavior with the
collective welfare: the figure of the family or the dynasty. We find so in germ at Ramsey the
justification of consideration of individuals with infinite life expectancy through the dynasty, the
justification New Classical macroeconomics has adopted since Robert Barro's (1974) article.
Ramsey’s 1928 paper so appears as a quite consistent construction, in spite of the numerous
hesitations that sometimes limit the meaning of its statements.
Some of these hesitations can be imputed to Ramsey’s argument itself: the introduction of
the article and the implementation of the corpus of hypotheses do not warn us at all for the
forthcoming variations. The other waverings hold in the fact that Ramsey strays widely from the
beaten track. Numerous theoretical problems, more or less identified in 1928, not always resolved
today, appear constantly on the fringe of his theory. Besides the problem of aggregation of goods
or behaviors, that of the distribution of income at the aggregate level, that of the definition of the
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capital22 appears the question of the formalization of the discount rates of utility, or moreover that
of the representation of an underlying decentralized economy. Ramsey seems to have the
intuition of these problems. He tries to protect himself from it by simplifying assumptions,
darkening widely the underlying economical mechanism of his representation. He
notwithstanding suggests possible tracks for solution23.
References
ARROW K.J. and HAHN F. [1971], General Competitive Analysis, North Holland, Elsevier Science
Publishers.
BARRO R. J. [1974], « Are Government Bonds Net Wealth ? », Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 81, n°6, 1095-1117.
BARRO R. J., SALA-I-MARTIN X. [1995], Economic Growth, MacGrow-Hill.
BLANCHARD O. [2000], « What Do We Know About Macroeconomics That Fisher and Wicksell
Did Not? », The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, vol. 115, n°4, 1375-1409.
BLANCHARD O. AND FISCHER S., [1990], Lectures on macroeconomics, Cambridge Mass.
London, The MIT Press.
BÖHM-BAWERK E. [1889a], The Positive Theory of Capital, 1891, London, Macmillan and Co.
http://www.econlib.org/library/BohmBawerk/bbPTC0.html.
BOIANOVSKY M. [1998], « Wicksell, Ramsey and the Theory of Interest », The European Journal
of the History of Economic Thought, vol. 5, n°1, 140-168.
BRIDEL P. [1987], Cambridge Monetary Thought, The development of Saving-Investment
Analysis from Marshall to Keynes, London, Macmillan.
CASS D. [1965], « Optimal Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation », Review
of Economic Studies, vol. 32, 233-240.
CHAKRAVARTY S. [1987], « Optimal Savings », in Eatwell, Milgate and Newman (ed.), The New
Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, London, Macmillan, vol. 3, 729-732
CHIANG A. C. [1992], Elements of Dynamic Optimization, New York, McGraw-Hill.
CLARK J. B. [1899], The Distribution of Wealth, A Theory of Wages, Interest and Profits, New
York, Reprints of Economic Classics, Augustus M. Kelley, 1965.
COLLARD D. [1996], « Pigou and Futures Generations: A Cambridge Tradition », Cambridge
Journal of Economics, vol. 20, 585-597.
ELSTER J and LOEWENSTEIN G. (ed.) [1992], Choice over Time, New York, The Russell Safe
Foundation.
FISHER I. [1907], The Rate of Interest, in Barber (ed.) [1997], vol. 3.
GASPARD M. [2001], « Les démonstrations de la règle de Ramsey : les mathématiques comme
self-control », Revue Economique, vol. 52, n°3, 595-604.
GASPARD M. [2002], Fondements et enjeux de la théorie mathématique de l’épargne de F. P.
Ramsey, Contribution à une histoire de la macroéconomie non keynésienne”, Thèse pour le
doctorat de sciences économiques, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne.
GASPARD M. [2003], « Ramsey’s Theory of National Saving: A Mathematician in Cambridge »,
                                                 
22 Absent in the analysis.
23 In doing this, Ramsey bequeaths to the economists numerous intuitions: intuitions of the problems just as much as
of the possible theoretical solutions. The definition of an optimal path of capital accumulation and the use of the
intertemporal optimization; the theoretical necessity of thinking a global economy in equilibrium all the time; and the
substitutability of the production factors which is associated to it; the allocation, justified by the economic planning,
of a substantial rationality to this community, which allows to make saving endogenous; the attempt finally, to
decentralize partially his community, and the met difficulties (places where Ramsey's eclipses are the most blatant)
make from his article a strangely modern article.
19
Journal of History of Economic Thought, forthcoming.
HARTLEY J. E. [1997], The Representative Agent in Macroeconomics, London, Routledge.
JACQUES J. F. and REBEYROL A. [2001], Croissance et fluctuations. Analyse macroéconomique de
la croissance, Paris, Dunod.
Keynes J. M. [1923], A Tract on Monetary Reform, The Collected Writings of John Maynard
Keynes, vol. IV, London, Macmillan, 1971
KEYNES J. M. [1925], « Am I a Liberal?” in Keynes [1931]
KEYNES J. M. [1926], « The End of laissez-faire », in Keynes [1931].
KEYNES J. M. [1930a], « Economic Perspectives for our Grandchildren”, in Keynes [1931].
KEYNES J. M. [1931], Essays in Persuasion, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes,
vol. IX, London, Macmillan, 1972.
KEYNES J.M. [1983], Economic Articles and Correspondences: Investment and Editorial,
Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. XII, London, Macmillan.
KOOPMANS T. C. [1965], « On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth », in The Econometric
Approach to Development Planning, Amsterdam, North Holland, 225-300.
KOOPMANS T. C. [1967], « Intertemporal Distribution and “Optimal” Aggregate Economic
Growth », in Fellner [1967], 95-126.
LOEWENSTEIN G. [1992], « The Fall and Rise of Psychological Explanations in the Economics of
Intertemporal Choice », in Elster and Loewenstein (ed.) [1992], 3-34.
MARSHALL A. [1920], Principles of Economics, 8ème edition (1ère edition 1890), London,
Macmillan.
NEWBERY D. M. [1987], « Ramsey Model », in Eatwell, Milgate and Newman (ed.), The New
Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, London, Macmillan, vol. 4, 46-48.
PIGOU, A. C. [1932], The Economics of Welfare, 4ème edition (1ère edition 1920), London,
Macmillan.
RAMSEY F. P. [1923], « Socialism and Equality of Income », Papers for the Cambridge
Discussion Society, in Ramsey [1991], 313-319.
RAMSEY F. P. [1927], « A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation », Economic Journal, vol. 37,
47-61.
RAMSEY F. P. [1928], « A Mathematical Theory of Saving », Economic Journal, vol. 38,
December, 543-559.
RAMSEY F. P. [1991], Notes on Philosophy, Probability and Mathematics, Galavotti (ed.),
Naples, Bibliopolis-Edizioni di filosofia e scienze.
ROBINSON J. [1978], Contributions à l’économie contemporaine, traduction française 1984, Paris,
Economica.
ROTHBARD M. N. [1987], « Time Preference », in Eatwell, Milgate and Newman (ed.), The New
Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, London, Macmillan, vol. 4, 644-646.
STROTZ R. H. [1956], « Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization »,
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 23, 165-180.
20
Synopsis
Objective
Assumptions on the production
function
Discount rate Long-term
equilibrium
Part I.
Community
Determination of Ramsey’s
rule with infinite life
expectancy
0),(0),( ≤≥ cafcaf aaa  and 
0),(0),( ≤≥ cafcaf ccc  and 
0=ρ
Bliss
Part II. §a.
Community
Graphical illustration
cst =),( cafa
cst =),( cafc
0),(),( == cafcaf caac
0=ρ
Bliss
Part II. §b
Individual
Graphical representation.
Individual rule with finite
live expectancy.
cst=),( cafa
cstcafc =),(
0=ρ
Part II. §c
Community,
then
individual
Discounting, with infinite
live, then finite live
expectancy
cst=),( cafa
cst =),( cafc
0>ρ Modified
bliss
Part III. §α
Community
Determination of the
interest rate
0),(0),( ≤≥ cafcaf aaa et  
or a = cst
0),(0),( ≤≥ cafcaf ccc et  
0>ρ
Part III. §β
Classes of
individuals
Very short-term equilibrium
a = cst
cste=),( cafc
0>iρ
{ }ni ,....,2,1∈
Part III. §γ
Dynasties
Long-term equilibrium
a = cst
0),(0),( ≤≥ cafcaf ccc et  
0>iρ
{ }ni ,....,2,1∈
Division in
two classes:
bliss or
subsistence
level
